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The ‘Rough edge of deterritorialisation’: Contemplation 
 
Maurits van Bever Donker 
 
Is there anything more contemplating than a cow? It seems to have a blank look, but not at 
all. It is true that there are animals that are not contemplative in the least but this is the 
lowest level of animals, for example cats and dogs, they hardly ever contemplate. That is 
why they experience little joy. They are bitter animals, they do not contemplate anything. 
They echo the damned exactly [...] Gilles Deleuze1 
 
To  frame  this  paper,  which  given  its  focus  on  the  installation  Red  should 
ostensibly deal with a question of aesthetics and technology, with an epigraph 
that situates the contemplative capacity of a cow alongside the echo of the damned, 
is perhaps a little strange. It is this haunting echo, however, that asks for a re-
working of contemplation and that finds a resonance in the effect evoked through 
‘Red’, an effect that draws out the rumbling of the non-Western in the frame of 
Western philosophy.2 Rather than approach this strangeness as something to be 
resisted in order to assert the apparent clarity of what appears to us, a resistance 
that would allow an articulation of an instance of clear aesthetic judgment, thereby 
affirming a sense of subjective certainty, in what follows I seek to abide by its 
unsettling effect. This unsettling encounter with a work of art, an encounter that 
provokes a Kierkegaardian trembling and exceeds the scripts in which it becomes 
legible, opens, in my reading, toward a re-working of contemplation away from 
judgment and towards what Nietzsche calls ‘life’.3 Contemplation, in this 
instance, is offered both as an action and as a capacity, a capacity that is not 
peculiarly human and that begins to posit the subject as a question for thought. 
As Derrida suggests in his critique of both Lacan’s and Levinas’ production, in 
keeping with a certain Cartesianism, of a distinction between the human and that 
which it is not, namely the machine or the animal (what he terms the ‘animot’), the 
human, the animal, and the machine are all similarly responsive to the coding of 
language. It is the claim to subjective certainty that deploys the distinction as part 
of its conceptual scaffolding.4 Red, through its desire to inhabit the dislocated space 
of a gift that, in its own narrative, carried a weight akin to the task of post-
apartheid reconciliation, offers itself as a peculiar instantiation of this unsettling 
effect. 
 
2 
 
In this essay, I seek to abide by the unsettling effect provoked by an encounter  with  
Gush’s  installation,  Red,  which  I have  read  and  encountered through four 
platforms: the digital lens of his website; the montage effect of the documentary by 
the same name; the installation housed in the Ann Bryant Art Gallery in East London, 
and the conference ‘RED ASSEMBLY: Time and Work’ that accompanied the opening 
of the installation on 27 August 2015 and at which this paper was first presented.5 Doing 
so requires us to grapple not only with its twists and turns, but also with the 
undercurrents that articulate its effect, an effect that is not, and can never be, total. 
Taking my cue from Deleuze’s statement on contemplation, in this paper I first move 
through Gush’s installation and its attendant documentary before working through the 
concept of ‘contemplation’, so as to bring us to the ‘rough edge of deterritorialization’, 
in short, to what Deleuze names as a point-of-view.6 In producing this reading of the 
concept I begin with Benjamin’s essay on art and technology and its relation to life, 
drawing on Kant and Nietzsche so as to specify the stakes of contemplation. Through the 
resonance between Nietzsche’s critique of history, Benjamin’s reading of the work of 
art, and Césaire’s sense of a people to come, I attend to the ‘echo of the damned’–not just 
the way in which the non-contemplative echoes the damned, but also the damned as an 
echo, a recurring refrain that unsettles contemplation itself–as it seeps through the 
installation, Red. Following this I return to Benjamin and Deleuze so as to specify what I 
call the rough edge of deterritorialization, before ending on Fanon. There is, then, a 
poignant question that resides in this paper’s own undercurrents: How, or, at least 
where, can those who have been produced as ‘the damned of the earth’ find joy?7 
 
Reading Red 
To encounter the installation, Red, is to enter into a series of constellations, 
crystallizations, and absences, which provoke a re-figuring of the encountering 
subject. It is not, however, its exploded structure that provokes this re-figuring, but 
rather its pedagogical nature: the installation attempts to shape the political 
undercurrents of its effect by attending to the viewer through its documentary film. 
This pedagogic effect draws out the visceral presence of the worker in the installation, 
and runs the risk of being closed down in a necessary and yet commonplace 
rendering in terms of labour and race relations. I suggest, however, that this effect 
simultaneously elicited for me a very particular reading, one that  confronts the 
problem of subjective certainty. 
 
The first encounter with the installation is marked by a strong sense of violence. The 
shell of the ‘Mandela car’ (a gift that was meant to be symbolic of reconciliation and 
the un-working of alienation) is presented on wheels that are not its own, with all its 
cavities and openings  exposed.  The  doors  and hoods of the bonnet and boot still 
hang, but now on walls. The wheels and tires are gone, as is the engine and indeed 
the entire undercarriage of the vehicle. The vehicle’s devices of comfort and  safety,  
namely  the  upholstery and airbags, are displayed transformed, as beds, as ‘strike 
uniforms’, and in the  Ann  Bryant  Art  Gallery  version  of  the  installation,  located  
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inside  the house, with the frame of the car outside, in the yard. The slippage here, 
the sliding between locations in the sprawling out of the vehicle, is reinforced by the 
use of a different tone of red for every panel of the vehicle: each panel signifies a 
line of flight, a restless movement that seems to resist its address as a concrete part 
of the vehicle’s whole, consistently evoking a tendency to arrive elsewhere, or indeed, 
to not arrive where it was intended.8 
 
The gift is presented here as ravished. It has been laid bare, or as  Aimé Césaire, in the 
Notebook of a Return to the Native Land, and Frantz Fanon, in Black Skin, White 
Masks, phrase it in speaking of the condition of the black man [noir] in the moment 
of its production as black [nègre] (i.e. as essence not adjective): it has been 
‘sprawled flat’ or ‘spread-eagled’, put on display.9 It is clear that this installation 
asks to be read as hosting, and indeed in its Ann Bryant Gallery instantiation, as 
housing, the articulations of the workers in the Mercedes plant: the vehicle is 
produced as clothing them, as housing them, even and especially, in their rebellion. 
What is sprawled out and put on display here is not simply the vehicle, but also the 
gift, the worker. This is accentuated in the accompanying documentary in the middle 
of a segment featuring a perspective  articulated  by  Ian  Russell,  the  former  HR  
Manager at the Mercedes plant in East London. As he explains the ‘recognition 
agreement’ that enabled a ‘relationship by objectives programme’, the camera (which 
often meanders either through East London or the Mercedes plant) stands still,  
focusing on the statue  of one of  the founding members of the Black  Consciousness  
movement  in  South  Africa,  Steve  Biko.  In  the  midst  of a discussion of 
compartmentalization, premised on a separation of work and politics, the camera 
raises in a moment of apparent distraction a question of consciousness. 
 
The managers, the negotiators, even the workers, in their interviews given as part of 
the documentary all agree on one thing: the plant is central to the possibility of life 
in East London. Thousands and thousands of workers, their dependents, and the 
zones in which they spend their wages, are all dependent on the German 
manufacturer and, as such, it is necessary to make the plant work. The strike and 
occupation of the plant, which is often physically and economically violent, works to 
place that making work into question, as does the installation Red. At its core, then, I 
read in Red the posing of a question which is, on its terms, a reading of the strike 
and the gift: what is this life that is deemed to be worth living? Or, stated more 
pointedly for what is named as the post-apartheid, what does  Biko  mean when he  
declares that the purpose of Black Consciousness is to achieve ‘the gift’ of  ‘giving  the 
world a more human face’?10 
 
Art against Judgment 
In his short and posthumously published ‘Theory of Distraction’, written from 1935 to 
1936 during the time in which he rewrote ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its 
Technological Reproducibility’, Walter Benjamin seeks to address the question: what is 
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the effect of art after the destruction of aura?11 As he had demonstrated in the first ‘Work 
of Art’ essay, technological reproducibility evolved to such an extent that, in our modernity, 
the meaning and use of art had thoroughly shifted. There are two key elements in this 
shift, the first hinging on ‘aura’, and the second on ‘film’. The refinement of the 
technological aspect of reproducibility, for Benjamin, can be understood as a slow 
transition away from mimesis toward expression. Aura, in this trajectory, carries the 
weight of ‘authenticity’,12 it is a truth effect intrinsic to the work of art, hence its value in 
the roles of ritual and the sacred in society.13 Quite clearly art, in this instance, is still 
produced according to peculiar interests that are neither ostensibly democratic, nor 
necessarily concerned with life as it is lived by ‘the masses’. As technological 
reproducibility improves however, passing through stages such as the lithograph and then 
the photograph, this aura comes to be progressively eroded and, as such, the work of art 
increasingly runs the risk of being ‘worn out’.14 It is, finally, in film that the mechanism of 
the work of art’s reproducibility has become identical with the work of art itself. It has 
become a representation without the weight of aura: expression.15 For Benjamin the slide 
that is carried out through this evolution of technological reproducibility carries a very 
clear shift in what he calls the ‘effect’ of the work of art: it moves from contemplation to 
distraction (Zerstreuung, a term that is also translated as ‘entertainment’16), and 
presents a clear opportunity in the interests of life. 
 
The distinction between these two terms is critical, not only because they mark the ‘true 
humanity’ of the work of art through indicating its ‘unlimited adaptability’ as well as its 
functioning within the political sphere, but also as it enables us to grasp Red in relation to 
its affective effect.17 It is in contemplation, Benjamin argues, that the effect of the work of 
art has traditionally been located, an effect that was accentuated through its increasing 
separation from both ritual and the sacred.18 At stake in contemplation is, precisely, the 
capacity for the subject to consider itself within a frame of subjective certainty: the work 
of art elicits the attention of the subject, drawing the subject into it, fixing the subject in 
place, so as to render it as that for which the work of art is. In short, contemplation 
enables what Immanuel Kant names as Judgment. Due to its centrality to what can be 
grasped as the European project of Man, a project that includes colonialism and its 
aftermaths which are evoked in the echo of the damned, it is worth briefly digressing into 
a reading of Kant so as to specify its terms in some detail. 
 
In Kant’s system, judgment is produced as a concept to attend to the difference between 
theoretical and practical philosophy, where the former has to do with ‘understanding’ and 
the latter has to do with ‘reason’.19 More specifically, this distinction whereby 
‘understanding and reason are two distinct jurisdictions over the same territory of 
experience’ that can never interfere or straightforwardly touch each other creates what 
can be considered as a split in the subject, an absolute separation into territories.20  
Territory, in this instance (and this is critical for understanding what Deleuze and 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
5 
 
Guattari rritorialization and deterritorialization) refers to the part of an a rritorialization 
and deterritorialization) refers to the part of an a priori concept’s field that the subject 
can know, it is the relation between the object of such a field and the ‘requisite 
cognitive faculty’ (that is, understanding and reason), and the subject’s capacity to 
legislate (to have agency in relation to concepts) in relation to it is named by Kant 
as ‘realm’.21 
 
Judgment operates, in Kant’s argument, as a ‘necessary subjective principle’, a 
principle that is imputed into nature so as to allow the Western subject to recognize 
purposiveness in it and, through this, to enable a bridging of the two territories of 
philosophy. It operates, effectively,  at  the  level  of  an  ‘as if’.22 As Kant argues in The 
Perpetual Peace, purposiveness is supplied by us to nature in order that we might 
act in it as if it is ordered.23 This necessary principle carries a similar function to the 
imputation of a distinction between man and animal-machine that structures the 
Levinasian and Lacanian statements on ethics (discussed in Note 4); it allows an 
authoritative claim to intentional action (an intentional response) and it is to this 
extent–the claim to intentionality–that it is necessary.24 Critical in this recognition 
and subsequent extension of purposiveness is aesthetic judgment which, as Kant 
suggests, functions as a ‘critique which is the propaedeutic of all philosophy’: it is 
the first step,  the intertwining, that makes philosophy  and the European project of 
Man possible, ‘for us’, as it enables this ‘us’ to recognize the purposiveness in Law 
(understanding) and  Ends (reason).25 
 
The contemplation of Art (as well as the contemplation of nature as art) is then, as 
Spivak has argued, a mechanism through which the trajectory of European 
philosophical critique after Kant–as well as its colonial projects grasped as a 
philosophical extension of the gift of Man to the world–takes place (Critique of 
Postcolonial Reason, 30).26 This ‘gift’, however, is integral to the production of the 
black man (noir) as black (nègre), a process that is diagnosed as ‘thingification’ in 
interventions such as Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism and Fanon’s Black Skin, 
White Masks, and which is evoked in the sprawled-out installation of the ‘Mandela 
car’. Benjamin’s difficulties with contemplation do not, however, stop at the level of 
its complicity with this thingification. Rather, he argues further that it is replaced, in 
our modernity, by the Fascist production of ‘the audience’ as a seizing hold of the 
work of art at the level of its distraction.27 This mass that does not recognize itself as 
a class is affirmed, according to Benjamin, through the film as a spectacle for 
consumption: it ‘maintains property relations’, placing the world on a trajectory 
towards war.28 
 
It is the ‘wearing out’ of the work of art that  occurs  in  the  shifting  of  its effect away 
from contemplation and towards distraction that makes this seizing hold by Fascism 
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possible. However, it also carries a positive potentiality for Benjamin, a potential that 
he names under the concatenated sign of ‘Reproducibility–distraction–
politicization’.29 Distraction, rather than  affirming a sense of subjective certainty and 
its attendant concepts of property and right, in its dissolution of the work of art into 
a multiplicity of subjects offers the possibility of an education, the crystallization of a 
sense of class consciousness that exceeds the self and enables a terrain for struggle.30  
This possibility amounts  to  the  recognition  of  what  Benjamin  names  as  ‘a  new  
beauty  in what is vanishing’ and which, in his letter responding to Adorno’s critique 
of his Work of Art essay and the Arcades Project, he refers to as a ‘proper reading’ 
that entails the ‘construction’ of a new habit adequate to what can be newly seen in 
the fading of  aura.31  Although  in  his  essay  on  Leskov,  titled ‘The Storyteller’, 
Benjamin is particularly writing on the ‘craft’ of storytelling, which is a fading 
practice of distraction, what he locates in the moment of its fading is useful for the 
reading of distraction in relation to contemplation that I am developing here. He 
suggests that what is newly visible is the pedagogical aspect of storytelling, a ‘task 
[focused on fashioning] the raw material  of  experience’ through  the  peculiar  practice  
of  the  ‘hand’ as it connects what he calls the eye and the soul.32 It is the habit of 
storytelling, developed as an artisanal craft,  to extend  the openness of duration 
toward its listeners (as opposed to the immediacy of information that is fully bound 
to its time).33 As such the storyteller – who requires proper listening that is 
contingent on having ‘boredom’,  a ‘community of listeners’ and a listener who is 
practiced in ‘self-forgetting’  – has the effect of orienting his listeners towards a 
future that is always a ‘continuation to a story that is just unfolding’.34 The 
substitution of the work of contemplation for the effect of distraction in Benjamin’s 
argument, a substitution that might address the Kantian inscription of judgment, is 
tempered in his broader text through an affirmation of a future that is marked by  a  
difference  that,  in  the  terms  I have been developing here, can neither be reduced 
to the animal or to the human. To work this out more fully, it is necessary to return 
to the question of the contemplative capacity of a cow, especially to the focus of its 
‘blank stare’ 
 
Immanent Evaluation and the Emergence of a New People 
Deleuze’s invocation of the cow immediately recalls the opening of Nietzsche’s ‘untimely 
meditation’ on the ‘Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’ which, in turn, offers a 
sense through which the re-working of contemplation might be oriented. For Nietzsche, it 
is not ‘what man is’ but rather ‘what he can be’ that produces the shape of his 
intervention, a perspective that immediately places it in opposition to Kant’s sense of 
disinterested contemplation that finds judgment as an expression of what Man already 
is.36 Arguing that life should be understood as ‘a future to come’, Nietzsche sets out to 
specify the limits of history as an element in the creation of life.37 While his 
formulation of Monumental, Antiquarian, and Critical modes of history are perhaps the 
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most widely read aspects of his meditation, the focus of my reading here will be on his 
expression of life and its relation to the contemplative capacity of a cow.38 The cow, or 
cattle as he phrases it, is not capable of judgment as it does not have a sense of time that 
moves linearly from the past to the future, rather, it has mastered the art of 
‘forgetting’.39 As Benjamin might put it, the cow has mastered the art of properly listening, 
or reading, such that it might leap towards the new. Man, however, driven forward by the 
weight of history, a weight derived from a Hegelian teleology inscribed in the concept of 
‘world process’, has lost its capacity to act unhistorically and to make such a leap.40 
 
This is not to argue that history has no benefit  for  life,  rather,  Nietzsche posits the 
notion that it is in the  service  of  an  unexamined  teleology  that each mode 
accumulates history as a weight that stifles its productive capacities – Monumental 
history ‘transforms reality into a technical object’; Antiquarian history stifles man 
within the ‘stench’  of indigeneity; and Critical history traps man within the cyclical 
nature of its operation.41 In the face of this removal of the possibility of creation due 
to the weight of history, which he names as an ‘Occidental prejudice’, Nietzsche asks: 
‘Are there still human beings […] or perhaps only thinking-,  writing-  and  speaking-
machines?’.42 The machine in this formulation refers to an automaton, a 
programmed and finely balanced mechanism that can only perform prescribed 
functions. This, it seems, is the sickness inherent in the ironic existence as the heir to 
a world process that culminates in the present  age:  the  new  is  already  completed; 
one is destined to suffocate in the dust of history, or in the case of ‘the damned’, to 
loiter on the edge of its threshold without entering. In a formulation that Césaire will 
come to accentuate through the ordering effect of blackness, Nietzsche argues that the 
only antidote is to ‘create for your selves the concept of a people’, to construct a future 
through which one might become ‘first-born’, become a beginning and not an end.43 
 
The task of constructing a people is both made more urgent and more complicated 
by  Césaire  in  his  1956  lecture  on  ‘Culture  and  Colonialism’.44 Within a frame in 
which colonialism is understood as the mechanism that enables the thingification of the 
non-European (Césaire is deliberately constructing a political solidarity that extends 
beyond Africa and its Diasporas) through, in part, the weight of history, Césaire 
similarly calls for the creation of a new people.45 This people, however, cannot be 
created according to a plan. Rather, they are an expression of a Nietzschean ‘future-
to-come’ whose conditions, Césaire argues, it is the work of black artists and writers 
to produce. Such an arrival of a  future-to-come understood as  a people  that  has been 
marked by colonialism but that is no longer hemmed in by this marking: a people 
that is no longer within its cut, would truly be ‘first-born’. However, it is not simply 
life, but also the weight of being produced as black through thingification that, for 
Césaire, orders the production of an aesthetic sensibility adequate to the conditions 
that would enable such an arrival. This people, who are named in a  political  
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construction  as  black  by  Césaire,  will not be reducible to a difference between 
Europe and its others, an insistence that immediately complicates how this ‘black’, as 
a naming, is meant to be thought.46 
 
Nietzsche’s suggestion that the creation of a new concept of a people might be 
adequate to a future is rooted in an ethical project that is, from our perspective, 
enabled by Césaire’s intervention. Life, he argues, remains to be learned ‘as a craft’ 
and ‘from the ground up […] practiced remorselessly’.47 This  practice,  first  
articulated  by  Nietzsche  in  the  meditative  calm  of  the cow, is not simply about 
forgetfulness as such, but rather has to do with a capacity to leap, to act 
unhistorically, against the markings of one’s subjectivity. Nietzsche names this 
practice a ‘hygiene of life’ that may be capable of organizing the chaos as an 
expression of a point of view.48 Such a sense of the practice of learning life, a 
practice that offers immanent evaluation as a mode of distinction and decision, 
returns us to the Deleuzian inscription of contemplation with which this essay began. 
 
As Luis de Miranda argues, for Deleuze the subject marks a ‘constant process of 
singular becoming’.49 Whereas for Kant the subject is a fixed point located on the 
caesura between the mind and body, between reflection and action, and made 
certain through taking its ‘I’ as an ego in the moment of judgment, Deleuze 
suggests that this understanding mistakes a ‘singular determination’ (namely, 
reason) for an ‘essence’ (Ontology/Ethics).50 Rather, following Spinoza and 
Plotinus and  in a  formulation that resonates  with Césaire, Deleuze suggests that 
Being needs to be grasped as an ‘affirmation of a living difference’ that 
‘complicates all beings’.51 While Kantian morality takes the presumed essence of 
reasonableness ‘as an end’ so as to realize Man as adequate to this, Deleuze argues 
that such a process actually reflects the ‘fatigue of the real’ and works to root the 
subject in place.52 In distinction from this condition, which Deleuze names in an 
echo of Levinas as ‘the damned’, the subject emerges as a ‘folding’ along the ‘molar 
line’, ‘rupture line’, and ‘molecular line’, each of which corresponds with a 
particular understanding of desire–a concept that similarly threads the installation 
Red.53 
 
Resisting the quasi-psychoanalytic framing of desire as ‘the wish for what we believe 
we do not have’, de Miranda suggests that the molar line is the line of 
‘territorialization’, of  convention,  duty,  and  the  injunction:  ‘comply with  the norm 
and you will  be beautiful’, which seizes up desire; the rupture line is where  ‘desire  
makes  things  flow’ through  a  ‘deterritorialization’ that  allows lines  of  flight;  and  
the  molecular  line  is the  fold  that  straddles  the tension between the first two, it is 
the line of life that abides by the ‘rough edge of deterritorialisation’.54   To  be  either  
fully  territorialized  and  coded  into  the socius (that is, to have subjective certainty 
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and to be stifled under the weight of history), or to be fully deterritorialized with no 
grip on the socius (that is, to  be  fully  schizophrenic),  is  to  be  with  ‘little  joy’,  to  
find  oneself  as  only patient, without producing an adequate cause. This expression of 
the subject, which is ‘anomal’, between the lines, in an affirmation marked as a 
‘becoming that is always an adventure’, is what is held in a moment of 
contemplation that is turned toward its own body as, perhaps, a work of art.55  As 
Miranda phrases it: ‘every single thing is a contemplation of that which it derives 
from, which is life becoming difference, flesh of endless disparity’.56  Contemplation, 
in this formulation that carries the tone of Nietzsche’s and Césaire’s interventions is 
much closer to an affirmation of distraction as Benjamin formulates it. Contemplation  
is  not  passive,  is  not  disinterested  or  the  domain  of  the Bourgeoisie; rather, it 
works as an ‘envisaging of its own requisites’, as a body ressive of desire as power, as 
Deleuze articulates it paraphrasing ressive of desire as power, as Deleuze articulates 
it paraphrasing Nietzsche, not as ‘that which I want [but] by definition [as that which] 
I have’.57 As such, it is attentive to the habit of its singularity, folding, unfolding, 
and refolding along the lines, a perpetual becoming ‘adequate  to  that which happens’, 
a practice of learning life.58 This practice responds in its orientation toward life to 
the echo of the damned that haunts Deleuze’s affirmation of contemplation, and the 
question that Red poses for thought. As such it abides by the possibility, articulated by 
Benjamin in his essay on the Work of Art read in conjunction with his Theory of 
Distraction, of a pedagogic moment in which the conditions for a new concept of a 
people might be produced, the offering, ultimately, of a gift of a more human face. 
 
Why then is there a strangeness in encountering the installation Red? Its depiction of 
the gift, the worker, ‘sprawled-flat’, refuses to draw the subject into the work in a 
mode of self-affirming disinterested contemplation, or judgment. Rather, it unsettles 
the subject in a manner not recuperable through the Kantian sublime; turning its 
contemplation toward its body not as the locus of Kantian reasonableness, but rather 
as a ‘small packet  of power’ that experiences joy in its folds, that seeks to be 
adequate to difference rather than reducing difference to an instance of the same – a 
contemplation that presses the sovereign ego of Kantian judgment and of the 
elevation of the human over the animal to vanish in the distance of its duration.59 
This contemplation, then, is a response to the echo of the damned, as Fanon 
articulates the cry of this echo: ‘oh my body, always make me a man who  
questions’.60   In  the  encounter  with  Red,  the  viewing  subject  contemplates his 
body and, perhaps, begins to question. 
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Notes 
1 On background to Red and Red Assembly, see the editors’ introduction to this 
issue. Deleuze cited in de Miranda,  “New  Life,” 45. 
2   For  a  consideration  of  ‘echo’ that  resonates strongly with my thinking of this 
opening that is produced, see Spivak, ‘Echo’. Apart from registering two objections 
in her reading of the dominant articulations   of   the   story   of   Narcissus   and 
Echo,  Spivak  produces  a  reading  that offers through abiding by the cut of Echo’s 
enunciations,   a   sense    of    ‘insufficiency’ as ‘the name  not of the limits of self- 
knowledge [Narcissus] but of the possibility of deconstruction’ (Ibid., 25). Echo, here, 
becomes an  enunciation  of  differance (Ibid.,  26). 
3   See   Nietzsche,   “Uses   and   Disadvantages.” See   Derrida,   “And   say   the   
Animal responded?” In his critique of Lacan’s Cartesianism, Derrida returns us to 
the instability of the claim to intentionality that marks Lacan’s exclusion of the 
‘animal-machine’. In brief, the role of language in the structure of the unconscious 
produces the subject as less than intentional or agential. Rather, it is a body that 
is responsive to coding, not unlike the animal or the machine (Ibid., 129, 137). See 
also Deleuze and Guattari, “1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal.” 
5  See http://www.simongush.net/red-2/ 
6  See Deleuze, The Fold. 
7 See Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth. As Fanon makes clear both in his Black Skin 
White Masks and The Wretched of the Earth, ‘the native’ is produced through the 
thingification of colonialism as the damned of the earth, as less than human, and as  
sliding into the category of ‘the animal’ due to an apparent ‘insensibility to ethics’ 
(Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 32). The language that Fanon deploys to describe 
the status of the colonised is eerily similar to that used by Lacan in his marking of  a 
distinction between the human and the animal (discussed in note 4 above). For Fanon, 
while violence enables a certain ‘taking of place’ (Ibid., 47) in the moment of 
decolonization, it is not able to deal with the ‘Manichean problem’ (Ibid., 31) of Man as 
the conceptual terrain that  produces the  native  as such–it maintains the  binary,  
even  if  it shifts positions within it. What is  more urgent is that which might come after 
the moment of decolonization: the project of ‘working out new concepts, setting afoot 
a new man’ (Ibid., 255). In the terms under discussion in this essay, this might 
amount to inventing a new expression of contemplation, one not premised on 
subjective certainty or the distinction between Europe and its Others. 
8   See Lacan, ‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter”’, for a discussion of the structure 
of the unconscious that is recalled by the fluidity of the installation. See also Fink, 
Between language and Jouissance, for a discussion of this in relation to desire, a 
common thread in the conference, ‘Red Assembly: Time  and  Work’. 
9   See Césaire, Notebook, 8-9, and Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 93. 
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10   Biko, “We Blacks,” 51. Benjamin,  “Theory  of  Distraction.” The revised version 
of the “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological  Reproducibility”  is  published  
in  the  same   volume, pp. 19-55, and includes additional Theses and notes. Hereafter 
I refer to this version as II followed by thesis (so, II Thesis 2). The better known 
first version was published in Illuminations, 217–262. Unless indicated otherwise, all 
references are to this edition. 
12    Benjamin, “Work of Art,” Thesis 2. 
13   Ibid., Thesis 4-6. 
14  Benjamin, “Theory of Distraction,” 56. 
15 Benjamin, ‘Work of Art’, Theses 12-13. Deleuze will say that a further shift has 
occurred with the emergence of modern cinema: broadly, a shift from the movement-
image to the time-image (Cinema 2, 41), as the emergence of a new aesthetic that is 
expressed in conjunction with many new signs, series, and cuts that emerge in this 
shift. An aesthetic adequate to the unsettling of the subject and the world in which a 
new sense of time no longer available to simple linear progression emerges for 
thought. 
16  Benjamin, “Theory of Distraction” 57. 
17   Ibid., 56-57. 
18    Benjamin, “Work of Art,” Thesis 4. 
19   Kant, Critique of Judgment, 3-4 and 11. 
20   Ibid., 11. See also Brown, The Primitive, 106-110. 
21   Kant, Critique of Judgment, 10. 
22   Ibid., 16. 
23  Kant, Perpetual Peace, 144-146. 
24    Derrida,      “And      say      the      Animal responded?” 127. 
25   Kant,  Critique  of  Judgment,  29;  19.  See also Cohen, ‘Three Problems’. As 
Cohen’s argument suggests, aesthetic judgment ultimately seems to hinge on a 
capacity for a judgment on the sublime, something that Kant implies in his discussion 
of the  Analytic of the Sublime in The Critique of Judgment, is not universal. As 
Spivak points out in her reading of this passage in the third Critique, Kant excludes the 
‘raw man’, the native, from those that have such a capacity, See Spivak. A Critique, 
especially footnote 32 on 26-29. 
26  Spivak, Critique, 30. 
27  Benjamin, “Work of Art,” II Thesis 19. 
28   Ibid. 
29  Benjamin, “Theory of Distraction,” 57. 
30  Benjamin,  “Work  of  Art,” II Theses 18-19. Benjamin,  “The  Storyteller,” 
87;  Bloch et al, Aesthetics and Politics, 137. 
32   Benjamin, “The Storyteller,” 108. 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
12 
 
33   Ibid., 90-92. 
34 Ibid., 91 and 86. For a reading of this openness of duration in relation to the 
distinction between the human and the animal, see Lingis, ‘Animal  body,  inhuman 
face’, where he argues  that  the  human  is an organism among other organisms 
unfolding in a rhizomatic ‘spreading of duration’ (168). Lingis’  argument  draws near 
to that of Levinas and Lacan in its mechanism of distinction between  the human and 
the animal. However,  for  Lingis, the task is to allow the duration of the animal to 
break through, to shatter the bracketing of flows that gives the illusion of agency, so 
that we might experience ‘joy’ (Ibid.,  182). 
35   de Miranda, “New Life,” 130. 
36 Nietzsche, “Uses and Disadvantages,” XVIII. 
37   Ibid., 59. 
38 For a reading of the three modes of history and their implication for the role of 
critique today, see Bové, “Introduction: Nietzsche’s Use and Abuse of History,” 1- 
16. 
39   Nietzsche,   “Uses   and   Disadvantages,” 61. 
40   Ibid., 97. 
41   Ibid., 69-75. 
42 Ibid., 66 and 85. See also Deleuze’s discussion of the figure of ‘the truthful man’ 
who judges life, and the ‘sick man’ who is sick with life, for a reading of how the 
time-image   in   modern   cinema   begins   to address  this  problematic  of  judgment  
that Nietzsche  sets  out  for  thought  (Cinema  2, 137-143). 
43   Nietzsche,   “Uses   and   Disadvantages,” 100 and 107. Deleuze similarly 
suggests that the task of producing oneself as adequate to the aesthetic sensibility 
of the time-image, a sensibility that resists the becoming automata that inheres in 
the movement-image, entails the invention of a people, a becoming minor that 
hinges on an ethical position expressed in the formulation: ‘I is another’ (Cinema 2, 
184-222). 
44   Césaire, “Culture et colonization,” my translations. 
45   Ibid., 192-193. 
46   Ibid., 200. 
47   Nietzsche,   “Uses   and   Disadvantages,” 118 and 120. 
48   Ibid., 123. 
49   de Miranda, “New Life,” 133. 
50  Deleuze, “Ontology/Ethics,” 2. 
51   de Miranda, “New Life,” 118; Deleuze, “Spinoza/Leibniz,” 5. 
52   de Miranda, “New Life,” 133. 
53 Ibid., 110-117. See also Levinas, On Escape. For us, of course, this also echoes 
Fanon.  
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54   de Miranda, “New Life,” 140 and 108-132. 
55   Ibid., 151. 
56   Ibid., 130. 
57  Ibid., 131; Deleuze, “Ontology/Ethics,” 5. 
58   Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 149. 
59  Deleuze, “Ontology/Ethics,” 5. 
60   Fanon, Black Skin/White Masks, 206. 
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